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RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-VENDOR-PURCHASER-RISK OF LOSS-COMMON
LAw.--Appeal by vendee, in action for ddmages brought by vendor,
for breach of contract to purchase an Arizona date orchard, consist-
ing of realty, packing plant, warehouse, equipment, and other per-
sonal property. The purchase price was $75,000, payable $5,000 on
contract, $20,000 on deliirery of title and possession, and the balance
to be paid in quarterly instalments within six years. The contract
stipulated that for purposes of adjusting taxes, insurance, and other
charges against the property, possession was to date from the sign-
ing of the agreement. Vendor was to be allowed a reasonable time
to remedy any title objections which might arise. Eight days after
the contract was signed the packing plant and warehouse were de-
stroyed by fire, without fault of either party. Vendee thereupon
requested the vendor to make an adjustment for the loss, but the
vendor refused. Vendee then stopped payment on the $5,000 check
he had given as deposit. At the time of the loss the vendor was
ready, willing and able to perform in accordance with the terms of
the contract. The vendor subsequently sold the property to another
purchaser for an amount less than $75,000. He seeks to recover
the difference between the two purchase prices as damages. The
vendee pleads in defense a partial failure of consideration. At the
trial the vendor was awarded his damages as claimed. Held, affirmed.
In executory contracts for the sale of real property, the risk of loss is
upon the vendee where the vendor was ready and able to perform
at the time of the loss and the loss was not occasioned by the vendor.
Ross v. Bumsteaid, - Ariz. -, 173 P. (2d) 765 (1946)'.
It is best to consider the vendee's two assignments of error sep-
arately as they involve two distinct aspects of the law.
The first problem concerns the law of contracts. The vendee
contends that the contract under consideration is conditional and that
the conditions thereof were unperformed at the time of the loss. Con-
sequently, the vendee asserts that he has assumed no binding obliga-
tion and cannot be held liable for the vendor's damages. The court,
in denying the validity of this contention, distinguishes between execu-
tory contracts which are conditional and executory contracts which
are unconditional. A conditional contract is held to be one whose
very existence and performance depend on a contingency and con-
dition.' Without the fulfillment of the conditions, the conditional
contract does not bind the party who is not to perform until such
1 Reedy v. Kelley, 208 Ala. 305, 94 So. 86 (1922) ; French v. Osmer, 67
Vt. 450, 32 AtI. 254 (1895).
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conditions or contingencies are satisfied. On the other hand, an un-
conditional contract is an absolute agreement through which a party
binds himself to do or not to do a particular thing in the future.
2
After making this distinction, the court concludes that the contract
in the instant case is unconditional. The fact that the parties stipu-
lated that many of the unperformed acts, when performed, were to
be considered performed as of the date of the signing of the contract,
was significant in leading the court to, said conclusion. Another
factor of weight, though not expressly noted in the decision, was
that the acts which remained unperformed at the time of the loss
were not extraordinary, and were usual acts required of parties in
contracts of this nature during the interim period from the signing
of the contract to the closing of title.
The vendee's second assignment of error asserts that even if
the contract is unconditional the risk of loss still must fall upon the
vendor. This contention is an elaboration upon the vendee's trial
court defense of partial failure of consideration. The Arizona court
having no precedent in point within the state, and no statute appli-
cable to the situation, turns to the decisional law on the point in other
jurisdictions to provide the answer to this second assignment of error.
The problem of the risk of loss in an executory contract for the sale
of realty was first considered in the chancery courts of England 3 and
the rule there settled is still the majority rule in this country under
common law.4 The majority rule applies the theory of equitable
conversion, whereby the vendor is trustee of the legal title after sign-
ing a contract for the sale of his realty and the vendee is the equitable
owner of, and the person beneficially interested in the property.
Under the majority rule, the risk of loss is cast upon the vendee
where there is a partial destruction or deterioration of the realty
provided that the loss was not caused by the vendor and he is able
to convey good title at the time of the loss. 5
Some jurisdictions have felt that the majority rule imposes too
harsh an obligation upon the vendee of realty and have placed the
risk of such a loss upon the vendor.6 The states holding to this effect
are in the minority today.7
At one time in New York the rule seemed settled, and not with-
out reason, that the risk of loss should fall upon the party in pos-
2 Hercules Powder Co. v. Harry T. Campbell Sons Co., 156 Md. 346, 144
AtI. 510 (1929) ; see Rockhill Tennis Club of Kansas City v. Volker, 331 Mo.
947, 56 S. W. (2d) 9, 17 (1932).
3 Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1801).
4 Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1801) ; Parcell v. Grosser,
100 Pa. 617, 1 Ati. 909 (1885) ; Fouts v. Foudray, 31 Okla. 221, 120 Pac. 960(1912); Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N. Y. 168, 90 N. E. 430 (1910); see Note,
22 A. L. R. 575 (1923).
5 Ibid.
6 La Chance v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 500, 183 Pac. 216 (1919); Hawkes
v. Kehoe, 193 Mass. 419, 79 N. E. 766 (1907).
See Note, 22 A. L. R. 578 (1923).
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session.8 However, the Court of Appeals has apparently settled the
New York rule today in accordance with the majority view.9 The
Uniform Vendor-Purchaser Risk Act of New York 10 has been held
applicable only where there is a material destruction of the premises,
so that as to a partial loss the common law view as now settled by
the Court of Appeals is still controlling."
In the instant case the court, after reviewing the authorities,
adopts as the common law of the State of Arizona the majority rule.
The vendee, therefore, is held liable for the damages suffered by the
vendor. The court does not have to decide the vendor's right to ob-
tain specific performance, but it is fair to infer that had such an action
been brought the vendor would have been successful.
In deciding this case according to the majority rule, the Arizona
court reaffirms the well defined rule in this country to the effect that
the established common law will be applied where there is no statute
controlling the issue under consideration, provided that said common
law is not contrary to the public policy and laws of the state as mani-
fested in its constitution and legislative enactments, and also pro-
vided that it is not contrary to similar federal documents and
enactments.'
2
It may well be said that the conclusion reached by the court in
the instant case is in contravention of the layman's interpretation of
such a situation according to the ordinary rules of conduct of busi-
ness affairs. The dissenters may argue that the vendee showed good
faith by offering to perform provided that he receive an abatement
in the purchase price, and that manifestly, the vendee desired to pur-
chase, but that he sought to have all that he purchased, and would
restore the premises to their former condition with the funds con-
stituting the abatement. To the business man this might be a fair
interpretation of the situation.
The vendor in the instant case received damages as substitu-
tional redress for the conveyance he contracted to make, and upon
him was thrust the burden of securing a new purchaser. It is thus
s Smith v. McCluskey, 45 Barb. 610 (N. 1Y. 1866); Wicks v. Bowman,
5 Daly 225 (N. Y. 1874).
9 Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N. Y. 168, 90 N. E. 430 (1910) ; Neponsit Realty
Co. v. Judge, 106 Misc. 445, 176 N. Y. Supp. 133 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
'ON. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAw § 240-a. It is interesting to note that the
New York statute provides that where there is an immaterial destruction, the
vendor and vendee are not deprived of their right to enforce the contract, but,
it allows an abatement of purchase price to the extent of the destruction. In
the light of the decision in World Exhibit Corp. v. City Bank Farmers Trust
Co., 296 N. Y. 586, 68 N. E. (2d) 876 (1946), it would seem that this statu-
tory provision is limited to an action" for specific performance.
11 World Exhibit Corp. v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 270 App. Div.
654, 61 N. Y. S. (2d) 889 (2d Dep't 1946), aff'd mem., 296 N. Y. 586, 68
N. E. (2d) 876 (1946); 21 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 104 (1946).




obvious that were this case to be decided in accordance with the mo-
tives of the parties as the layman would determine them, and not by
the intent as expressed in the written agreement, the court would
be thrust upon the horns of an insurmountable dilemma. The law,
as it is administered today, through decisions and statutes, is not
primarily concerned with the motivating considerations which bring
parties into written contract. It is concerned only with the intent
of the parties as expressed in the instrument. 13 To require the
courts to inquire into extrinsic motives would throw the law of con-
tract and evidence into confusion.
If the harshness and somewhat arbitrary effect of the common
law rule as to the risk of loss problem in the sale of realty is to be
minimized, statutory direction should be the instrumentality adopted
to achieve such an end. It should be borne in mind, however, that
the statutory law is often more extremely opposed to the layman's
sense of justice than is the common law.
C. J. B., JR.
EQUITY - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF WHERE No PROPERTY RIGHT
is VIoLATED.-Plaintifts, members of a religious sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses, seek injunctive relief against repeated arrests
and jailings under an unconstitutional city ordinance forbidding the
distribution of circulars, handbills and notices of meetings as viola-
tive of the sanitary code. Plaintiffs allege deprivation of their rights
of freedom of religion, speech, press and assembly, and inadequacy
of the remedy at law. The arrests and jailings are continuing not-
withstanding the fact that the defendant city officials, police chief
and trial judge know of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. A
demurrer by the defendants is predicated upon the absence of any
allegation of breach of a property right, and upon the claim that equity
will not interpose to prevent prosecution in the criminal courts.
Held, under special circumstances equity will grant an injunction even
in absence of injury to property rights. Kenyon v. City of Chicopee,
- Mass. -, 70 N. E. (2d) 241 (1946).
It was the rule at common law that equity would protect only
property rights,' which doctrine has been widely adhered to both in
England and in the United States. The modern trend, however, has
been to expand equity's jurisdiction to protect all rights recognized
in law. Generally speaking, those rights to which equity extends its
13 Gans v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 214 N. Y. 326 108 N. E. 443 (1915);
Goldstein v. Frances Emblems, 269 App. Div. 349, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 740
(1st Dep't 1945).
1 Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
1947 ]
